WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL

Request for Comments To Assist in Reviewing and Identifying Unfair Trade Practices and Initiating All Necessary Actions To Investigate Harm From Non-Reciprocal Trade Arrangements

Docket Number USTR-2025-0001
March 11, 2025

The National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) appreciates the opportunity to provide input in response to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative's (USTR) Federal Register notice, *Request for Comments To Assist in Reviewing and Identifying Unfair Trade Practices and Initiating All Necessary Actions To Investigate Harm From Non-Reciprocal Trade Arrangements* ("the FR Notice") (90 FR 10677, Feb. 25, 2024).

About NFTC

The NFTC, organized in 1914, is an association of U.S. business enterprises engaged in all aspects of international trade and investment. Our membership covers the full spectrum of industrial, commercial, financial, and service activities. Our members support establishing and maintaining international trade norms that reflect the critical role that an open, rules-based international economy plays in the success of American businesses, entrepreneurs and workers, and shared global prosperity. The NFTC also supports the effective enforcement of those rules.

I. INTRODUCTION

NFTC is pleased to provide comments as part of USTR's effort to identify unfair trade practices and non-reciprocal trade arrangements by U.S. trade partners. We understand that this is one of many reviews announced in the Presidential memorandum of January 20 establishing the America First Trade Policy that will contribute to the Trump administration's broader trade policy.[1] In addition, we commend the administration for seeking to implement policies at home that boost U.S. economic growth, jobs, and competitiveness.

A. Tackling Unfair Trade Barriers Strategically

The America First Trade Policy rightly recognizes the harmful impact that foreign country trade, tax, regulatory, and other measures can have in preventing U.S. companies from accessing foreign markets. Breaking down those barriers and helping to create export opportunities for U.S. goods and services should go hand-in-hand with efforts stimulate domestic investment and create a more resilient and competitive economy at home.

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1 https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/america-first-trade-policy/

As this submission will discuss in more detail below, wide ranging non-tariff barriers and unfair trade practices, including measures such as local content requirements, forced localization, subsidies, tax policy, export restraints, quotas, offsets, standards and testing requirements, technical regulations, and trade facilitation challenges, just to name a few, can have an outsized influence on whether companies can competitively export from the United States.

However, as USTR considers appropriate actions to remedy these practices, NFTC strongly urges careful consideration of whether tariffs are the most effective way to address these practices. Tariffs are one tool in the trade policy toolbox, but they are better used as a scalpel, not a sledgehammer.

For this review to successfully break down trade barriers and lead to commercially meaningful access to foreign markets, USTR will need to engage the full range of policy tools and use the approach best suited to each type of barrier and trade partner. If the end result of this review is that unfair trade barriers remain, U.S. tariffs increase, and trade partners retaliate against U.S. goods and services, there will be less economic opportunity for the United States and American communities, not more. We therefore strongly urge that USTR use this exercise as an opportunity to bring trading partners to the table and negotiate the reduction of barriers to trade and investment.

B. Assessing Reciprocity

The Presidential Memorandum on Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs correctly notes that the United States has had one of the most open economies in the world and imposed fewer barriers to imports than many other major world economies. Our open economy has fostered significant economic benefits for the United States, including greater consumer choice, lower prices, and more competitive and specialized manufacturing, which has attracted capital inflows, created jobs, and promoted economic growth.

NFTC welcomes the President's recognition that trade and regulatory measures in markets abroad reduce opportunities for U.S. companies. We share the objective of making trade more reciprocal so that we can grow the United States economy, strengthen our trade relationships, and benefit American manufacturers, service providers, farmers, ranchers, content creators, inventors, entrepreneurs, and small businesses.

However, what reciprocity in our trade relationships looks like can take many forms. We encourage the administration to take a broader view of reciprocity than simply comparing average tariff rates. For example, tariff rates and goods deficits do not capture the significant contribution to trade generated by trade in services. The United States is the world's largest exporter of services and had a services trade surplus of $278.4 billion in 2023.

Where there is a significant difference in tariff rates that is adversely affecting U.S. interests (e.g., Brazil's derogation from its MERCOSUR tariff rates to protect its domestic polyethylene industry), getting other countries to lower their rates is a better approach than raising U.S. rates to meet theirs. To that end, we encourage the administration to look beyond economy-wide average tariffs and consider the circumstances of individual sectors. Tariffs in some sectors (such as pharmaceuticals and IT products) are reciprocally already very low among major economies, whereas those in other sectors tend to be higher. A focus on the latter would ensure that the administration's actions do not add or increase tariffs in areas where today few exist. These kinds of granular negotiations – while often difficult – result in strategic, reciprocal terms of trade and, at the same time, provide mechanisms to bring compliance should trading partners stray from these terms.

We also advise the administration to consider that, in many instances, raising U.S. tariffs would undermine rather than enhance the competitiveness of U.S. industries. For example, increasing U.S. tariffs that raise material and production costs for the U.S. biopharma sector makes U.S. products less competitive globally, raises costs to patients, and reduce investment in research and development, potentially limiting or delaying development of new drugs in the pipeline, and hurt U.S. biopharma workers.

C. Bilateral Goods Deficits

We recognize that this administration places significant emphasis on bilateral goods trade deficits; however, a bilateral goods trade deficit does not necessarily indicate an unfair or non-reciprocal trade relationship. A goods trade deficit simply indicates that the United States bought more goods from a trade partner than we sold to them. A primary reason this happens is that the United States is a large and wealthy country with a population of approximately 342 million and per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of approximately $81,695 annually.

In 2024, the United States had its largest goods deficits were with Canada, China, the European Union, India, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Vietnam. None of the countries listed above comes close to matching the United States in this important metric of consumption potential. China, and India have extremely large populations, but much lower per capita GDP ($13,873, and $11,940, annually, respectively). And while the European Union ($43,000), and Canada ($53,000) have among the highest per capita GDPs of these countries, they are still only about half as affluent as the United States by this measure. Switzerland alone has a per capita GDP greater than the United States ($99,995) but only 8.97 million people – slightly larger than New York City (8.1 million). Other factors like high savings rates in some of these countries also contribute to lower rates of goods consumption, as does the large and persistent U.S. Federal government deficit, which drives a significant portion of consumption in the United States.

Given the massive disparities of size, income, and spending levels, it is no surprise that the United States consumes more than these countries do. This consumption, fueled by U.S. businesses and consumers, drives economic growth in the United States. As a result, USTR should take great care when crafting policies that aim to reduce this economic activity. Trying to reduce the bilateral trade deficit with these countries would depend in part on reducing U.S. imports, but at a scale that would require major changes in savings and consumption patterns of U.S. consumers, levels of Federal government spending, and the general strength and international dominance of the U.S. economy. Such a reduction in imports would also significantly reduce the competitiveness of U.S. companies and their workers.

Increasing U.S. exports would be the other side of the equation. There is no doubt that more can be done in most of the markets identified to expand opportunities for U.S. companies so that we can sell more to and within them. Unfortunately, the Biden administration did not prioritize promoting U.S. exports in the broader trade policy context and we are long overdue for a course correction. NFTC fully embraces the America First Trade Policy's directive to USTR to identify potential opportunities to engage in bilateral or sector-specific market opening initiatives (see section II.B below).

D. Treatment of Value-Added Taxes

NFTC does not believe that value-added taxes (VATs) are unfair or discriminatory taxes that should be met with reciprocal level tariffs in the United States, however, NFTC agrees recognize that there is disparate treatment of VATs and U.S. income taxes at the World Trade Organization. The United States should instead seek to address these divergent approaches in how international trade rules on subsidies have been written and interpreted with respect to VAT vs. income tax rebates, in order to enable U.S. tax policy to better boost the competitiveness of U.S. exports.

Beyond this, simply offsetting a VAT with a tariff does not account for the additional complexity of the US sales tax system and would not result in "reciprocal" treatment. In the United States, state and local sales taxes often take the place of a VAT. Sales taxes are typically owed where the product is received or consumed. Consequently, when a European resident orders from a U.S. retailer, they do not pay U.S. sales tax, just like a U.S. consumer can obtain a VAT rebate on purchases of European products. A recent analysis from the Tax Foundation explains that VATs and sales tax are two different forms of consumption taxes on consumers. Likewise, the structure of VAT systems and the rebates they provide for exports is not a factor that businesses consider as a material advantage to locating investment or sourcing products from a country with a VAT system rather than from the United States with its different tax system.

II. ADDRESSING UNFAIR TRADE AND NON-RECIPROCAL BARRIERS

As noted above, there are a range of tools beyond tariffs that the Trump administration can rely on to break down trade barriers and achieve more reciprocal trade. Two of the most effective options include enforcing commitments that have already been made under existing agreements and negotiating to open markets and achieve the elimination of unfair or non-reciprocal measures.

A. Using Existing Enforcement Mechanisms

Virtually all U.S. trade agreements include enforcement tools that USTR can leverage to ensure that commitments made by our trade partners are actually delivered. The mechanisms may include recourse to formal dispute settlement procedures, issue-specific dispute settlement mechanisms, referral of issues to a Trade Commission established under the agreement, and other mechanisms and procedures designed for a specific purpose or agreement. The Trump administration should take advantage of existing enforcement tools where they exist.

NFTC appreciates the Trump administration's focus on specific unfair foreign tax policies that can disadvantage U.S. companies doing business abroad. Certain countries are taking an increasingly aggressive approach to tax that targets U.S. taxpayers, including through such policies as digital services taxes, deeming embedded royalties and imposing withholding tax (where no royalties exist) and public country-by-country reporting that goes beyond current tax norms. We encourage USTR to work closely with the Department of the Treasury on its ongoing review of discriminatory or extraterritorial taxes as part of the America First Trade Agenda and find solutions to address these policies in problematic markets like Australia. When foreign governments resort to burdensome, discriminatory, or excessive taxes or reporting regimes that depart from international tax norms or engage in tax harassment and unjustified or discriminatory audits, existing tax treaties and trade agreements may provide effective enforcement tools. NFTC encourages the administration to build on the long history Treasury and USTR have of working together to break down foreign tax barriers using all available enforcement resources and approaches.

1. China Phase One Agreement

The Phase One Economic and Trade Agreement ("Phase One Agreement") signed by the United States and China on January 15, 2020, addresses a wide range of trade and investment barriers that have stifled the competitiveness of U.S. companies in China's market. Much attention has been focused on China's failure to achieve its commitments regarding additional purchases of U.S. goods and services. Indeed, in some areas specifically identified for additional purchases of U.S. products, such as optical and medical instruments, China not only failed to achieve its purchase commitments, but in the years immediately following the Phase One agreement imposed significant new barriers to U.S. exports.

In another example of unmet commitments, the Phase One Agreement specifically references the domestic Bank Card Clearing Institution (BCCI) license applications of three U.S. electronic payments providers. China committed to ensure that China's Central Bank - the People's Bank of China (PBOC) - would operate an improved and timely licensing process for U.S. suppliers of electronic payment services applying for a BCCI license in China. PBOC subsequently finalized a two-step licensing process in June 2017 that would enable U.S. providers to access the domestic market. Today, nearly five years after signing the historic Phase One Trade Agreement, only two BCCI licenses have been granted. China should promptly complete the approvals required for all pending applicants to obtain a BCCI license.

The Phase One Agreement included many other commercially significant commitments, many of which have not been adhered to. The Financial Services chapter addressed many other longstanding trade and investment barriers affecting financial services, including foreign equity limitations and discriminatory regulatory requirements. The Intellectual Property (IP) chapter addressed longstanding concerns regarding trade secrets, pharmaceutical-related intellectual property, geographical indications, trademarks, and enforcement against pirated and counterfeit goods. The Technology Transfer chapter established binding and enforceable obligations to address several unfair technology transfer practices identified in USTR's Section 301 investigation. The Agriculture chapter addressed a multitude of non-tariff barriers to U.S. agriculture exports.

Each of the areas above merits review, and while we understand that USTR is conducting a separate review of China's compliance with its Phase One commitments as required by the America First Trade Policy Memorandum. Enforcement of these commitments is also an important aspect of addressing China's unfair trade and non-reciprocal barriers.

2. United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement

The America First Trade Policy Memorandum also requires USTR to initiate a separate consultation as part of the first six-year review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). NFTC will participate in that consultation to share our comments on the operation of the agreement. However, ensuring that Canada and Mexico are living up to the commitments that they made in the USMCA can also be an effective tool for addressing current trade barriers. For example, NFTC was pleased to see Mexico take steps that should resolve the ongoing dispute concerning GMO corn. NFTC urges the United States, Mexico, and Canada to work together to resolve the remaining disputes to address barriers to trade in energy and dairy, resolve uncertainty in the auto sector, and address measures that discriminate against U.S. digital platforms, content, and service providers. Illustrative examples of ongoing unfair trade practices by USMCA partners are discussed below.

- **Canada's Digital Services Tax (DST):** On August 30, 2024, the Biden administration requested USMCA dispute settlement consultations with Canada regarding its discriminatory Digital Services Tax Act (C-59), which targets U.S. companies providing digital services in Canada. C-59, which was enacted on June 20, 2024, and entered into force on June 28, 2024, applies a 3 percent tax on revenues of companies or groups with annual global revenues of €750 million or more and Canadian digital services revenue of more than CA$20 million from online marketplaces, online targeted advertising, social media platforms, and user data. The tax is retroactive to January 1, 2022, and companies will start paying the tax (including all retroactive amounts) on June 30, 2025. Although the consultation period concluded last November, the Biden Administration took no further action to advance this dispute.

- **Electronic Payment Services:** Under USMCA, Mexico adopted new high-standard Financial Services commitments related to cross-border trade, including the application of the national treatment and market access obligations for electronic payment services ("EPS"). As we approach the sixth year of USMCA, Mexico continues to maintain significant barriers for U.S. EPS suppliers that effectively prevent the suppliers from processing domestic payment card transactions in Mexico. USTR should ensure that Mexico takes all necessary steps to finalize, publish, and implement regulations that enable U.S. EPS suppliers to compete on a level playing field as soon as possible. For the avoidance of doubt, these necessary steps should include prompt public consultations in accordance with Mexican law and USMCA rules.

- **Online Streaming:** In 2023, Canada enacted a law (the Online Streaming Act, or C-11) that extends discriminatory rules that have long prevailed in Canada's broadcasting sector to the online economy. The law and related rules promulgated by Canada's regulator can compel U.S. platforms to promote Canadian over U.S. content and force U.S. companies to make financial payments into funds that only Canadians can access.

- **Intellectual Property (IP):** Both Canada and Mexico are not living up to their IP commitments under USMCA. Canada has not met its USMCA obligation to properly implement a patent terms adjustment (PTA) system because Canada's regulations impose limitations that prevent innovators from receiving full compensation for patent office delays. Mexico has failed to implement many of its USMCA IP obligations, including having adequate patent enforcement, regulatory data protection, and a patent term restoration system.

B. Eliminating Barriers Through Negotiation

When countries impose unfair and non-reciprocal barriers, eliminating them through negotiated outcomes is always the preferred option. Most enforcement mechanisms provide for various forms of negotiation to attempt to resolve issues before resorting to formal dispute processes. Even Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 provides for negotiations as one of the possible remedies to respond to measures raised in an investigation.

NFTC was pleased to see the America First Trade Policy call on USTR to identify prospects for potential market opening trade negotiations on a sectoral or bilateral basis. Negotiating new agreements or expanding existing ones creates an opportunity to reduce or eliminate tariffs on a reciprocal basis and create long-term solutions to eliminate trade barriers.

Digital Trade: NFTC was deeply disturbed when the Biden administration stepped back from promoting core digital trade policy priorities, such as eliminating barriers to cross-border data flows, forced data localization, mandates to disclose source code for commercial access to markets, and discriminatory treatment affecting trade in digital products and services. Successfully confronting an ever-growing list of digital trade barriers that limit opportunities for U.S. suppliers requires a united front across the U.S. government and active engagement and negotiation with trade partners. Digital trade barriers force American companies to divert resources toward costly local infrastructure, increase operational expenses, create market entry barriers for U.S. cloud and data service providers, and give local firms a competitive advantage over U.S. companies offering digital services. The United States should reclaim the lead in crafting high-standard disciplines for digital trade that support every sector of the U.S. economy from technology and financial services to agriculture and manufacturing.

The Biden administration's unwillingness to even identify significant digital trade barriers from past reporting on unfair trade barriers emboldened countries whose digital policies target leading U.S. companies, and many elements of the European Union's (EU) digital sovereignty agenda. To that end, NFTC was extremely pleased with the February 21 Presidential memorandum recognizing the critical importance of the digital economy and renewing emphasis on ensuring that U.S. digital companies can compete globally on a level playing field.

DSTs that disproportionately hit U.S. companies remain a critical concern. Most early DST proposals arose in EU countries, but more recently governments outside of the EU have followed suit, underscoring the growing risk of contagion if such proposals are not stopped before they are adopted. NFTC welcomes the administration's efforts to seek the elimination of DSTs that unfairly target U.S. companies and dilute the U.S. tax base.

NFTC appreciates the President's support for a permanent prohibition on customs duties on electronic transmissions. Uncertainty about the U.S. commitment to the current WTO moratorium has emboldened certain countries to call for its termination when it expires next year. Indonesia is already requiring customs declarations for software and certain other digital goods imports and even though the tariff is currently zero, compliance is complicated. Indonesia also collects VAT on these transactions which raises costs.

Sectoral Agreements: During the COVID-19 pandemic, new concerns arose that trade partners could weaponize export restrictions to exploit supply chain bottlenecks and cut off access to critical supplies. Since then, supply chain security and resilience have been a strategic concern. Negotiating with allies to reach new sector-specific agreements can be a creative approach that creates strategic partnerships in key sectors to strengthen supply chain resilience and preemptively address potential trade barriers. The Medical Supply Chain Resilience Act provides a good example of how these negotiations could be achieved. We commend the administration for including the idea of new sectoral agreements in its America First Trade Policy memorandum.

Zero-for-Zero: Successful examples of sectoral “zero-for-zero” tariff agreements include the World Trade Organization’s Information Technology Agreements and the Pharmaceutical Agreement, which can be expanded in terms of both product coverage and country participation. These zero-for-zero agreements could serve as a model for other sectoral agreements among key like-minded trading partners.

Government Procurement: The United States benefits from ‘reciprocal’ commitments with key trading partners, both in the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement and in our FTAs, that guarantee U.S. exporters access to foreign government spending – which often, in sectors like healthcare and defense, are a much greater share of the overall market in other countries than it is in the United States. These commitments deter the creation of “localization’ barriers that impede access for U.S. products. Those procurement agreements also require that other countries follow the same transparent procurement procedures that the U.S. does as a matter of our domestic law. Expanding our bilateral procurement arrangements with other countries could significantly increase U.S. exporters’ access to foreign markets.

FTAs: Comprehensive bilateral or regional free trade agreements (FTAs) should be considered where they advance America’s interests. These agreements remain the gold standard for providing durable and commercially meaningful access to new export markets and investment opportunities with key allies. NFTC supported the announcement during President Trump’s first term of the intent to negotiate bilateral FTAs with the United Kingdom and Kenya. These remain worthy objectives, and we were pleased that the President reiterated intent to negotiate an economic deal with the United Kingdom and negotiate a U.S.-India Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA). We hope that USTR will expand that list to include important markets like Argentina.

C. Principles for Tariff Measures

Above all else, should the administration determine that it is necessary to proceed with imposing new tariffs to mitigate unfair or non-reciprocal trade practices, to protect national security, or to respond to an emergency, NFTC strongly urges it to reconsider the elimination of several mitigation measures from recent tariff actions.

Access to a transparent, predictable, durable product exclusions process provides a critical valve for mitigating the potential inflationary impact of tariffs and harm to U.S. businesses and households. The administration need not grant every exclusion request, but having a mechanism for doing so provides a toolset with which to better manage the domestic impact of its trade agenda. This includes allowing tariffs to be better targeted at countries that are directly accountable for national security and other trade concerns. In addition, allowing companies to claim duty drawback for tariffs paid on materials that are critical to their U.S. manufacturing operations, thereby ensuring that tariffs imposed for domestic policy reasons do not harm the competitiveness of U.S. exports or jeopardize the U.S. facilities and jobs linked to them.

III. IDENTIFICATION OF SPECIFIC BARRIERS

There are several categories of non-tariff trade barriers that USTR should seek to reduce or eliminate on a horizontal basis because they are widely understood to distort trade flows and can be used to protect domestic industries. A summary of these barriers and a few specific examples are provided below:

Quotas and Import Licenses: Quotas and import licenses limit the quantity or value of goods that can be imported and are widely recognized as distortive trade practices that restrict market access. Import licenses that require burdensome or lengthy approval processes or are not issued automatically are particularly problematic.

Standards and Regulations: Some countries impose strict technical, safety, or environmental standards that importers may struggle to meet. These policies can create trade barriers that governments ought to engage to address even when the underlying objective for the measure is worthwhile. A number of recent European supply chain due diligence and transparency measures (e.g., the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive, Deforestation Regulation, Extended Producer Responsibility, and General Product Safety Regulations) are causing companies to struggle to comply as a result of extraterritorial application, shifting compliance burdens to companies, lack of information, and vague or unclear requirements that in some cases are causing lost export opportunities. Another concern (also arising increasingly in Europe) is the exclusion of U.S. companies from standards-setting processes, a development at odds with the spirit of open, consensus-based, and multi-stakeholder standards development and one that risks creating entrenched institutional biases against U.S. technology and companies.

> **Biodiversity/Digital Sequence Tax**: Late last year, the 16th Conference of Parties (COP16) to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) decided on the terms and conditions operationalizing the “Multilateral Mechanism on Benefit-Sharing from the Use of Digital Sequence Information on Genetic Resources” (MLM-DSI), which could have significant financial implications on the U.S. biopharmaceutical, food, and cosmetics industries. The MLM-DSI seeks to monetize the use of DSI from biological resources in product development. Parties propose to use MLM-DSI for industry to “fairly” share a percentage of “profits from biodiversity” to fund the recovery and preservation of Earth’s biological diversity. While the United States is not Party to the CBD, U.S. companies face the potential for extraterritorial taxes for U.S. innovation and intellectual property from countries that are Parties to the CBD and plan to transpose the MLM-DSI into national legislation.

Investment: Investment measures that restrict and distort trade include discrimination against companies based on their U.S. ownership, equity limitations that restrict U.S. investors from operating in or obtaining controlling shares in certain sectors, and requirements to enter into joint ventures or other commercial partnerships with local entities. “Trade balancing requirements” that limit a company’s imports or set targets for the company to export are also problematic.

Government Procurement/Local Content Mandates: Foreign governments often condition access to their market upon requirements by U.S. companies to achieve government-prescribed minimum levels of local procurement, or to invest certain minimum levels of capital in local production. These measures distort global supply chains, put foreign governments in a position to arm-twist U.S. companies, and artificially extract investments that would otherwise go to markets that devote themselves to creating attractive investment climates through good governance. In just one example, China has announced its newly amended Government Procurement Law will enshrine the basic principle that products that are made domestically should not be procured from abroad – a significant trade barrier given the Chinese government’s outsized role in the economy. Furthermore, the definition of “domestic product” will be based on a complex set of requirements for domestic production of the product, domestic content levels, and domestic production of key components and key technological processes, as well as in certain instances a requirement that the associated patents have their primary global registration in China. Several countries have localization and government procurement policies that discriminate against imported biopharmaceutical products

Intellectual Property (IP) Rights: While the U.S. offers high standards of protection for patenting innovative products, protecting regulatory test data, and IP enforcement, U.S. companies don’t enjoy the same standards of IP protections abroad. Compliance related to IP protection and enforcement under various trade agreements could be strengthened. U.S. biopharmaceutical innovators also currently face compulsory licensing threats in countries such as Colombia and Russia, whereas certain Latin American and other developing countries are proposing provisions to weaken IP rights and mandate technology transfer as part of the WTO TRIPS Agreement review discussions. Discussions are also underway on a pan-European compulsory licensing regime that includes proposals from the European Commission to force collaboration and technology transfer, despite existing compulsory licensing regulations at the Member State level.

Technical Barriers to Trade: Countries can use technical barriers to trade to disadvantage imported goods and create preferences for local products. These technical barriers to trade (TBT) requirements can cause supply chain disruptions due to additional testing requirements, imposes unnecessary compliance costs, reducing profitability; and delay product approvals, limiting U.S. companies’ ability to compete efficiently.

IV. CONCLUSION

NFTC appreciates the opportunity to share our perspective on USTR’s review of unfair and non-reciprocal trade barriers, and many other related aspects of the America First Trade Policy. We look forward to working with Ambassador Greer, his team, and the outstanding staff at USTR to make progress on the full range of these issues.

If you have questions, need additional information, or would like to discuss our input further, please reach out to Tiffany Smith at NFTC at tsmith@nftc.org.